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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ADEA TO
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS: Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Associates,
794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986)
Doctors, lawyers and other professionals often incorporate their
practices as professional service corporations' to gain advantages such
as tax benefits.2 To avoid liability to shareholders3 under federal an-
tidiscrimination laws,' these practitioners may decide against incorpo-
rating.' One such law, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. The primary purpose of a professional service corporation is to render a specific
kind of professional service. J. Philipps, J. McNider, D. Riley, Origins of Tax Law: The
History of the Personal Service Corporation, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 433, 434 (1983).
Today, every state has some statutory provision for the incorporation of professionals.
Bowman, The Professional Corporation-Has the Death Knell Been Sounded?, 10 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 515, 516 (1983).
2. Initially, tax considerations were the primary advantage for incorporating a pro-
fessional practice. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) effectively
eliminated the major tax advantages of incorporation. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (amending several Code
sections in chapters 26 and 42). See generally Bowman, supra note 1, for an analysis of
the major tax benefits of incorporation and the effect of TEFRA on professional service
corporations. The author also examines several nontax advantages for incorporation,
including limited liability, centrality of management, continuity of life, transferability of
ownership and increased efficiency. Id. at 520-23.
Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 also affected professional services corpora-
tions. See Labiner, There's Still Life in Professional Corporations, A.B.A. J. 34 (March
15, 1987) (arguing that there are good reasons for incorporation after the Tax Reform
Act); Witman and Murray, Professional Corporations: Are They Still Viable?, 27 LAW
OFFICE ECON. & MGMT. 327 (1986) (Tax Reform Act of 1986 tips scales against incor-
poration); Heilbronner and Stopek, 1986 Tax Reform: How It Will Impact the Typical
Florida Lawyer, 61 FLA. BAR J. 19 (1987) (recommending incorporation only for lim-
ited liability and not tax purposes).
3. "Most states [permit] only licensed members of the profession ... to own shares
in a professional corporation." See Bowman, supra note 1, at 522 (giving examples of
state statutes).
4. This type of action should be distinguished from those in which a non-share-
holder brings suit under an antidiscrimination act. The Supreme Court addressed the
latter situation in Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). See infra note 31
for discussion of Hishon.
5. See generally, Bowman, supra note I at 523-24, 530-33 (discussing traditional tax
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(ADEA),6 governs only "employee" 7 causes of action against employ-
ers.' Because shareholders in professional service corporations resem-
ble both employers and employees,9 application of the ADEA to such
corporations is problematic. In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Asso-
ciates,'° the Second Circuit held that a shareholder of a professional
service corporation was an employee entitled to ADEA protection."
and nontax disadvantages of incorporation); Whitman, supra note 2, at 339-41 (discuss-
ing disadvantages created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
7. The ADEA defines "employee" as "an individual employed by any employer."
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982).
8. See EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir. 1983) (if appellants were
not Zippo employees, ADEA is inapplicable to their cause of action); Garrett v. Phillips
Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1983) (a plain reading of the ADEA indicates
that an individual has a cause of action only if he or she is an employee when termi-
nated); but see Comment, EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co.: Choice of a Test for Coverage of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 64 B.U.L. REV. 1145, 1168-69 (1984) (The stat-
utory language refers to discrimination against "individuals," not employees or appli-
cants for employment, thereby indicating a Congressional intent to avoid limiting
coverage to employees in a strict sense). See also Doe ex rel Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospi-
tal, 788 F.2d 411, 422 (7th Cir. 1986) (there are no indications that "any individual"
means only an employee or an employer). Doe interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See infra note 26 for applicability of Title VII
decisions to ADEA cases.
9. Although variations exist, professional service corporations typically operate like
partnerships in that the corporation's member-shareholders have an equal interest in
corporate management, control, ownership, and profits. See infra notes 12-15 and ac-
companying text for discussion of shareholder status in New Haven Radiology Associ-
ates (NHRA), a professional corporation. See also Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Dowd and Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (the manage-
ment, control, and ownership of a professional corporation is like the management,
control, and ownership of a partnership).
Shareholders of professional corporations also resemble corporate employees because
they act as corporate officers, draw salaries as employees, and perform traditional em-
ployee duties. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for discussion of share-
holder status in a professional corporation. See also EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982) (salaried officers of association who
performed traditional employee duties are employees for purpose of the ADEA, regard.
less of their status as directors).
10. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
11. The court in Hyland stated that the corporate form of business precludes a
court from examining whether the entity in fact operates as a partnership. Id. at 798,
The court rejected NHRA's claim that the court should use an economic realities test to
determine whether Hyland was a partner or an employee. Id. at 797-98. The court
reasoned that the economic realities test failed to apply because courts developed the
test to distinguish employees from independent contractors. Id. at 797. See infra notes
39-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic realities test.
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In Hyland, Dr. Hyland and four other radiologists organized New
Haven Radiology Associates (NHRA) as a professional service corpo-
ration.' 2 Each of the founding members was an officer and director
with an equal voice in management. 3 Every shareholder-physician ex-
ecuted an employment agreement requiring each member to be a full
time corporate employee. 4 In 1980, the other members asked Hyland
to resign." Alleging a violation of section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA,16
Hyland filed this cause of action claiming that NHRA discriminated
against him on the basis of age. Hyland contended that NHRA was an
employer' 7 and that he was an employee protected by the Act.'" The
District Court of Connecticut rejected Hyland's argument and held
that the ADEA failed to cover Hyland because he was more like a
partner than a corporate employee.' 9 The Court of Appeals for the
12. Id. at 794. The physicians organized NHRA in 1972 under the laws of Con-
necticut. Id.
13. Id. at 794. Each member contributed the same amount of capital, received the
same amount of stock, and shared equally in any profits or losses. Id.
14. Id. at 795. The employment agreement also required each physician to submit
to the corporation all compensation earned from rendering any kind of professional
service. Id. Hyland's employment agreement differed from those of the other co-foun-
ders because it required six months' written notice of his intention to leave the corpora-
tion's employ. Id.
15. Id. Dr. Hyland was 51 years of age. Id. According to NHRA, complaints of
unavailability, lack of cooperation, and abusive conduct prompted the resignation re-
quest. Id.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1) (1982). This section prohibits an employer from dis-
charging any individual on the basis of age.
17. The ADEA defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees.. ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982). The
Act defines "person" as "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations.., or any
organized groups of persons." 29 U.S.C. § 630(a) (1982). The legislative history of the
nearly identical definitional provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982), states, "[the term 'employer' is intended to have its common
dictionary meaning, except as expressly qualified by the act." Interpretive Memoran-
dum of Title VII of H.R. 7152 Submitted Jointly By Senator Joseph S. Clark and Sena-
tor Clifford P. Case, Floor Managers, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. S7216
(April 8, 1964).
18. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text for a definition of "employee" and
the Act's applicability to employees.
19. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, 606 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Conn.
1985). The District Court decided that NHRA incorporated to gain advantageous tax
and civil liability treatment. See also Battle, The Use of Corporations by Persons Who
Perform Services to Gain Tax Advantages, 57 TAXEs 797 (1979) (discussing the federal
income tax advantages and potential detriments of professional service corporations).
The District Court applied an economic realities test and found that NHRA is a part-
19881
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Second Circuit reversed, holding that incorporation as a professional
service corporation precludes any further examination into the form of
business."0 Therefore, the ADEA covered Hyland as a corporate
employee.2a
Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to en-
courage the employment of able older persons and to prohibit arbitrary
discrimination based on age. 2 Since the ADEA is remedial, courts
must interpret the Act liberally23 to effectuate its purpose. 24 Due to
the ADEA's similarities to other remedial legislation such as Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196425 and the Fair Labor Standards Act,26
nership in all but name. Hyland, 606 F. Supp. at 621. The court reasoned that
NHRA's structure consists of an equal division of ownership and management and an
equal sharing of profits and losses among members, which are hallmarks of partnership
status. Id. The court therefore concluded that Hyland could not separate himself from
his management and ownership roles for a court to consider him an "employee." Id.
20. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798.
21. Id.
22. The purpose of the act is: "... to promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1985). See generally Comment, supra note
8 (discussing numerous studies and reports which culminated in the ADEA's passage),
See also Levine v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 646 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Congress' broad language in defining "employee" accords with congressional intent to
prohibit age discrimination against "any individual"); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., 589 F. Supp. 534, 538 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(the ADEA's primary purpose is to prohibit employment discrimination based on age).
23. Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983).
See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 1168 (discussing broad remedial legislation
and listing ADEA cases in support of a liberal interpretation). See also Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070
(6th Cir. 1982) (courts used a broad definition of "employee" when interpreting social
welfare legislation such as the ADEA and Title VII in order to effectuate the stated
purposes of the Acts).
24. The ADEA, as originally enacted, vested the responsibility for administration
and enforcement of its provisions in the Secretary of Labor. Congress transferred this
responsibility to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), effective
Jan. 1, 1979. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 2, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626 (1985).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Title VII and the ADEA contain similar definitions
of the terms "employee" and "employer." Compare 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) & (f) (1982,
Supp. 1987) (definitions of the two terms in the ADEA) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) & (f)
(1978) (the definition of "employer" and "employee" contained in Title VII). In addi-
tion, the verbiage proscribing age discrimination from the ADEA directly parallels sim-
ilar prohibitions against discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, and religion
contained in Title VII. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982) (proscribing age discrimina-
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decisions defining "employee" and "employer" under these Acts assist
courts in defining these terms under the ADEA.2 7
The ADEA's broad definitions provide little guidance for effectively
and uniformly determining who is an "employee ' 28 of a partnership or
a professional service corporation.29 Although partnerships3" are "em-
ployers" under the ADEA,3 1 the status of partners as "employees" is
tion) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1978) (Title VII proscriptions against discrimination
based on race, sex, national origin, and religion). See also B.L. Schlei & P. Grossman,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 393 (1976) (stating that some courts rely on Ti-
tle VII precedent to interpret similar ADEA provisions).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1978). Congress intended that the ADEA's enforcement
provisions mirror those in the FLSA. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2218. Compare 29 U.S.C.
§ 626 (1982) (ADEA enforcement provision) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 21 l(b), 216, 217 (1978)
(FLSA enforcement provision).
27. Title VII, concerning race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
ADEA, concerning age, prohibit an employer "... . to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(2)(a)(l) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 584 (1978) (Title VII and the ADEA have similar aims and substantive prohibi-
tions, including the elimination of discrimination in the workplace); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (Title VII
determines the scope of the ADEA's substantive prohibitions against discrimination).
But see Comment, supra note 8, at 1159 where the author argues that the court in Zippo
inaccurately relied on Lorillard. In dictum, the court in Lorillard stated that the sub-
stantive prohibitions of Title VII could be the basis for the substantive prohibitions of
the ADEA. Id. at 1159-60. Thus, the court in Zippo based its decision on dictum
which has little precedential value. Id. at 1160.
28. See supra note 7 for definition of "employee."
29. EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1069 (6th Cir.
1982) (the definitions of "employee" and "employer" leave great room for interpreta-
tion); see also Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 600 F. Supp. 63, 64
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (Congress obviously left the ADEA definition of "employee" for the
courts to decide).
30. Section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an associa-
tion of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." See also
Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners manage and control the
business and share in the profits and losses).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 630(a), (b). See supra note 17 for a definition of "employer." See
also Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine and Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(Title VII's objective, the elimination of job discrimination, clearly extends to the pro-
fessional fields of law and medicine). The legislative history for a proposed amendment
to Title VII adds further support. This amendment, ultimately defeated, would have
exempted physicians employed by hospitals, thus lending support to the proposition
that professionals are within the scope of Title VII. 118 CONG. REC. 3798-3802 (1972).
1988]
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less certain.32 This uncertainty becomes even more pronounced when
a group of professionals rely on the corporate form to carry out their
practice.33 Moreover, an individual's title within the organization is
inconclusive in determining whether the individual is actually an em-
ployee. 3a Courts developed several tests to analyze employment situa-
32. See Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984). In Hishon, the
Supreme Court held that an associate in a law firm, organized as a partnership, stated a
cause of action under Title VII. 457 U.S. at 78. The Court stated that an associate was
an employee within the meaning of Title VII. Id. at 77.
The Court rejected the argument that Title VII exempts partnership decisions from
Title VII scrutiny. Id. The Court further found that the statute failed to create aperse
exemption for partnerships. Id. The Court reasoned that when Congress intends to
create an exemption to the Act, it expressly does so. Id. at 78. The Court noted the
express exemptions granted Indian tribes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (1982), small busi-
nesses, bona fide private membership clubs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1982), and certain
employees of religious organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). Hishon, 467 U.S. at
78 n.11.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that the Court's opinion should
not be read as extending Title VII to the management of a law firm by its partners. Id.
at 79 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that the relationship among part-
ners differs markedly from that of an employer and employee. Id. But see Reiver v.
Murdoch and Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (D. Del. 1985) (applying Title VII to
decisions among partners despite the majority opinion in Hishon).
In EEOC Decision No. 85-4, EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 1 6845, 7040 (March 18,
1985), the Commission refused to classify partners in a law firm as employees for the
purpose of reaching the jurisdictional prerequisite of fifteen employees under Title VII.
But see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partners are employees when the
partner asserts a fifth amendment privilege for partnership documents).
33. See supra note 9 for a discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing between pro-
fessional service corporation shareholders, corporate employees, and partners. In
Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998 (D. Del. 1985), the court indicated
the difficulty of applying Title VII to professional corporation directors, noting that
both the statutory language and the legislative history failed to indicate an express in-
tent to exclude the directors from Title VII scrutiny. Id. at 1005-06. Moreover, the
court pointed out that an amendment to Title VII extending the Act's coverage to edu-
cational institutions, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (1982)), indicated congressional intent to make Title VII's coverage more
extensive. Reiver, 625 F. Supp. at 1005. The Reiver court points out, however, that the
Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Dowd and Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984), held
that Title VII does not apply to professional service corporation shareholders. Refver,
625 F. Supp. at 1005-06. The Reiver court refrained from determining whether Title
VII applies to a professional service corporation shareholder. Id. at 1007. The court
concluded that such a decision would not have palpable consequences on parties' legal
interests in this case.
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies
Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal
Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 n.4 ("The issue is whether an employer-employee relationship
exists, not what title a worker holds. . ."); Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., con-
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tions and to ascertain who is an "employee." 35
In Bartels v. Birmingham,3 6 the United States Supreme Court found
that for the purposes of the Social Security Act, band leaders, rather
than dance hall owners, employed the band members. 37 The Court
first examined the employer-employee relationship, using the common
law "right to control" test.3' This test emphasizes the degree of con-
trol an employer exercises over the details and methods of an em-
ployee's performance.39 In Bartels, however, the Supreme Court
rejected the "right to control" test as too narrow for use with social
legislation, noting the absence of control under such legislation.' The
Court in Bartels held that under social legislation "employees" are
those individuals who, as a matter of economic reality, depend on the
business to which they render service.4
After Bartels, courts relied on two standards to determine who is an
employee under social legislation: the Bartels "economic realities" test
curring) ("An employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labelling its
employees as 'partners'."). Moreover, employment contracts labelling an individual are
not necessarily controlling. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832-33 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
35. Generally, courts consider the Act's statutory language, the legislative history,
existing federal law, and the particular circumstances of the case at hand. Calderon v.
Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir. 1981). The first two factors give little
guidance because of the lack of specific language defining "employee." See supra note
29 for discussion of the Act's broad definition of "employee." The final two factors
provide the primary gudiance in discrimination cases. See infra notes 36-63 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the specific tests federal courts adopted in various
circumstances.
36. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
37. Id. at 132.
38. Id. at 129-30.
39. Id. The common law agency test is the basis for the right to control test. Mares
v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 220(2)(a) (1957) (to determine whether one is an employee or an independent
contractor, the court must consider the extent to which a master exercises control over
the details of work). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Zippo Mfg.
Co., 713 F.2d 32, 32 (3d Cir. 1983) (in describing the "right to control" test, the court
stated that if the alleged employer had the right to determine both the type of work and
its performance the worker was an employee).
40. Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130.
41. Id. The court relied on United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947), and indicated
that the permanency of the relation, the skill required, the investment in the facilities for
work, the opportunities for profit or loss are all factors a court should consider. 332
U.S. at 130. The court in Bartels concluded that it is the total situation which controls.
Id.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
246 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:239
and a hybrid "right to control-economic realities" test.42 Echoing Bar-
tels, some courts which used the economic realities test found that an
employer-employee relationship exists where a strong degree of eco-
nomic dependence is present.43
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted
an "economic realities" test in Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission v. Dowd and Dowd, Ltd.'4 In Dowd, the court addressed the
issue of whether shareholders in a professional service corporation are
employees under Title VII.4'5 The E.E.O.C. alleged that Dowd &
Dowd violated Title VII when it denied pregnancy benefits to an em-
ployee.46 The court looked beyond the corporate form of business and
analyzed the economic reality of shareholders in a professional service
corporation. The court in Dowd held that a shareholder's role in a
professional service corporation is closer to that of a partner in a part-
nership than it is to a general corporate shareholder.47 The court con-
42. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d at 37-38. See generally Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066,
1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (listing cases according to the test the court applied).
43. See, eg., Hickey v. Arkla Industries, 699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983). The
court in Hickey based its determination of the degree of economic dependence on the
factors listed in Bartels, supra note 41, and added a fifth factor, the degree of control.
Hickey, 699 F.2d at 751-52. See also Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368,
1370 (9th Cir. 1981) (the court considered an additional factor, the importance of the
service to the alleged employer).
44. 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984). The EEOC relied on Dowd and decided
that in determining whether an individual is a partner or an employee, it will consider
such relevant factors as the individual's ability to control and operate the business, to
determine compensation, and to administer profits and losses. EEOC Decision No. 85-
4, EMPL. PRAC. DEc. (CCH) % 7041 (1985). In Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing,
757 F.2d 1376 (1985), the court explained the economic dependence aspect of the eco-
nomic realities test. Id. at 1385. The court stated that economic dependence disregards
whether the workers depend on the money they earn for obtaining the necessities of life.
Id. Rather, the test examines whether the workers depend on the employer for their
continued employment. Id.
45. 736 F.2d at 1178.
46. The EEOC filed a complaint against Dowd and Dowd, a professional service
corporation. Id. at 1177. The complaint alleged that the corporation violated Section
703(a) of Title VII by failing to amend its Health Benefits Plan to include pregnancy
benefits for its female employees. Id. An organization must have at least 15 employees
to be subject to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Unless shareholders of the
professional corporation were employees, Dowd and Dowd would lack the requisite
number of employees to be subject to the Act. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
47. Id. The court reasoned that the economic reality of the professional service cor-
poration in Illinois is that management, control, and ownership of the corporation is
much like the management, control, and ownership of a partnership. Id. In addition,
the court found that the overlap of state regulations governing professional service cor-
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cluded that professional service corporation shareholders are not
corporate employees and that Title VII, therefore, was inapplicable."8
Thus, the court treated professional service corporation shareholders
the same as partners under Title VII. 9
The second test developed by the courts to determine an individual's
employment status is the hybrid right to control-economic realities
test.5" In Spirides v. Reinhardt,5 a female broadcaster filed a com-
plaint alleging that her termination resulted from sex discrimination. 2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found it
necessary to consider the economic realities of all the circumstances
surrounding the employment relationship.53 Stating that no factor
alone is determinative, the court held that an employer's right to con-
trol the means and manner of the worker's performance is important.54
The court reasoned that if an employer controls and directs all
aspects of an individual's work, an employer/employee relationship
probably exists.55 The increased importance of the employer's right to
porations and partnerships supports the court's decision to treat shareholders of profes-
sional corporations similar to partners in a law firm. Id. at 1179.
48. Id. at 1178. The Dowd court relied on Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th
Cir. 1977). In Burke, the court considered whether an accounting firm consisting of
four partners and thirteen non-partners had fifteen or more employees and was, there-
fore, an employer under section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Burke, 556
F.2d at 868. The court concluded that Title VII does not apply to partners in a partner-
ship. Id. at 869.
49. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
50. See generally Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (listing cases
that adopted the hybrid test).
51. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
52. Spirides worked as a foreign language broadcaster for the Greek division of the
Voice of America. Id. at 827. She worked primarily under "purchase order vendor"
contracts. Id. The contracts provided that the contractor is independent and not an
agency employee. Id. After the addition of two female foreign nationals to the staff, the
Chief of the Service informed her that he could no longer justify spending funds on a
female voice. Id. at 827-28.
53. Id. at 831. The court expressly rejected the District Court's near exclusive reli-
ance on the employment contract language as indicative of the individual's employment
status. id. at 833.
54. Id. at 83 1.
55. Id. at 831-32. Additional factors a court or agency must consider include: (1)
the kind of occupation, and whether the work is usually done under supervision; (2) the
skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the employer or the individual
furnishes the equipment and place of work; (4) the length of time for which the individ-
ual worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by job; (6) the manner in
which the work relationship is terminated; (7) whether the employer gives annual leave;
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control thus distinguishes the hybrid test from the economic realities
test.
The decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo
Manufacturing Co.56 supports the use of the hybrid standard in ADEA
cases. In Zippo, the company discharged four district managers pursu-
ant to a clause in their employment agreement requiring termination at
age 65." According to the Zippo court, the procedural and remedial
sections58 of the ADEA derive from the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),"9 while Title VII provides the ADEA's substantive basis.60
The court in Zippo reasoned that because courts generally apply the
hybrid standard in Title VII actions61 and because employee status is a
substantive issue, the hybrid test is appropriate for determining em-
ployee status under the ADEA.63 Under the hybrid test, the court
held that the district managers were not employees for ADEA pur-
poses; rather, they were independent contractors. 6
(8) whether the worker is an integral part of the employer's business; (9) whether the
worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security
taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Id. at 832.
56. 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).
57. Id. at 34. Zippo engages district managers to sell its products to wholesale dis-
tributors and retailers. Id. at 33. Apart from commissions and bonuses, Zippo provides
no other financial benefits or insurance benefits to the district managers. Id. Zippo
exercises virtually no control over the district managers' operations. Id. District man-
agers are accountable to Zippo only for their sales volume. Id. at 34.
58. Id. at 38. The Zippo court relied on Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
Zippo, 713 F.2d at 38. In Lorillard, the Supreme Court found that, except for certain
express changes made by Congress, Congress intended to fully incorporate the remedies
and procedures of the FLSA. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 582.
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1978). Congress enacted the FLSA to remedy labor con-
ditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well being of workers. 29 U.S.C. § 202. See generally
Comment, supra note 8 (discussing the applicability of FLSA cases to ADEA cases).
60. In Lorillard, the Supreme Court found that Congress derived the ADEA's
prohibitions directly from Title VII. 434 U.S. at 584. But see Comment, supra note 8 at
1173 (distinguishing congressional intent with regard to age discrimination from that of
racial discrimination, concluding that the interpretation of congressional intent on race
discrimination is not a reliable source for intent regarding age discrimination).
61. Zippo, 713 F.2d at 37. See also Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th
Cir. 1982) (courts should refrain from using economic realities test in Title VII cases).
62. Zippo, 713 F.2d at 38.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court in Zippo found that the sales practices of the district managers
were not under Zippo's control. Id. Moreover, the district managers furnished their
own equipment. Id.
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ADEA AND PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates,65 the Second Circuit
assessed the ADEA's applicability to a professional service corporation
shareholder. Circuit Judge Miner, writing for the majority, initially
addressed the issue of whether a court should treat a professional ser-
vice corporation as a partnership. 66 Judge Miner rejected both the eco-
nomic realities and hybrid tests,67 finding that despite similarities in
structure and operation the court must consider a corporation's freely
chosen form of business.68 Thus, use of the corporate form precludes
any examination into whether the entity in fact operates as a
partnership.69
The court then examined Dr. Hyland's employment relationship
with NHRA.7 ° The court rejected the economic realities test for deter-
mining when to define a corporate shareholder as a partner,71 stating
that the roles of shareholders and partners are mutually exclusive.7 z
Therefore, the court concluded that any test designed to determine
whether an individual is a partner or an employee is irrelevant because
the ADEA covers every corporate employee.73 Turning to Dr. Hy-
land's status in particular, the court reviewed his employment relation-
ship with NHRA and concluded that he was a corporate employee.7'
The court found that Hyland's proprietary interest and his corporate
65. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
66. Id. at 797-98. The court also discussed the liberal interpretation which a court
should give a remedial statute of this nature. Id. at 796. The court further focused on
the congressional aim of prohibiting age discrimination. Id. The court also stated that
the benefits of antidiscrimination statutes do not extend to partners. Id. at 797.
67. Id. at 797-98. Although the court recognized that shareholders of professional
service corporations have many attributes of partners, it noted that partnerships often
operate like corporations as well. Id. at 798.
68. Id. The court further reasoned that having made the decision to incorporate,
NHRA should not now be able to claim that their corporation is a partnership. Id.
69. Id. at 797-98. The court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC
v. Dowd and Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984), which held that the management,
control, and ownership of a professional corporation is similar to that of a partnership.
Id. at 1178. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dowd.
70. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
71. Id. The court, however, appeared to condone the application of the "economic
realities" test to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor. Id. See
supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the economic realities test
and the hybrid test.
72. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798.
73. Id.
74. Id. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for discussion of Dr. Hyland's
employment relationship.
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employment were consistent.7 5
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Cardamone argued that the manner in
which a corporation functions determines its form of business under
the discrimination laws.76 Judge Cardamone denied that everyone who
works for a corporation is an employee within the ADEA.77 A court
therefore must analyze the organization's status to determine whether
an individual is an employee under the ADEA.78 Rejecting the hybrid
test as inappropriate in a partnership setting,79 Cardamone espoused
an inquiry into the factors of compensation and control."0 Cardamone
applied the test to this case and determined that Hyland was a tradi-
tional partner. 81
The Hyland decision attempts to resolve the status of shareholders of
professional service corporations under the antidiscrimination laws.8 2
The court's determination that these shareholders are employees cov-
ered by the ADEA establishes a clear standard in a murky area of the
law.83 Moreover, the court's departure from both the economic reali-
ties and the hybrid tests is sound because courts originally established
these tests to distinguish employers from independent contractors.84
75. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798.
76. Id. at 798-99.
77. Id. at 799. According to the dissent, case law elucidates the absence of a per se
rule which includes all those working for a corporation as employees. Id. at 800. Fur-
ther, Judge Cardamone points out that no rule excludes courts from considering high-
level officers as employees. Id.
78. Id. The dissent began its analysis by discussing the operation of partnerships.
Id. at 799-800. To the dissent, partners traditionally manage and control the business
and share in the profits and losses. Id. at 800. The dissent then examined the NHRA
within the partnership framework and concluded that structurally and economically
NHRA is best characterized as a partnership. Id. The equal contributions of capital,
equal sharing in profits and losses, and equal voice in management persuaded the dis-
sent that partnership status for NHRA was appropriate. Id.
79. Id. at 801-02. The dissent agreed with the majority that the "hybrid" test is
inappropriate because courts traditionally used this test to distinguish an employee from
an independent contractor. Id.
80. Id. at 802. Cardamone apparently adopted this test from EEOC Dec. No. 85-4,
EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCII) 6845, 7040 (1985), discussed supra notes 32 and 44, be-
cause there are similarities between the two tests and because he discusses the EEOC
decision before pronouncing his test. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 801.
81. Id. at 802.
82. Id. at 798.
83. See supra notes 30-32 for problems of applying the ADEA to professional ser-
vice corporations and partnerships.
84. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798.
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ADEA AND PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
The decision also enforces the congressional intent to prohibit age dis-
crimination in the work environment; prior to Hyland, shareholders of
professional service corporations acting as partnerships could evade the
Act's strictures.85
In the final analysis, however, the court adopted a form over sub-
stance approach to determine whether professional service corpora-
tions and their shareholders are subject to the ADEA. The dissent
correctly points out that neither labels nor titles should determine the
status of an organization; rather, the manner in which an entity func-
tions should govern whether it is subject to the discrimination laws.8 6
Although the economic realities and hybrid tests are inadequate when
applied to professional service corporations and partnerships,8 7 the
court's analysis should include an examination into the organization's
actual operation. Furthermore, the EEOC, which administers and en-
forces the ADEA,8 8 established standards for courts to use in ascer-
taining the Act's applicability to professional service corporations.
8 9
The Hyland court erred in failing to defer to these standards for deter-
mining Dr. Hyland's discrimination claimed against NHRA. 9'
The Hyland decision extends the scope of antidiscrimination acts to
include shareholders of professional service corporations. Therefore,
the applicability of the antidiscrimination laws to these shareholders
85. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dowd, holding
that shareholders of professional service corporations are not employees under Title
VII. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Dowd and Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d
1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798-99 (2d Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 801-02. The Hyland dissent stated that these tests are inadequate because
the focus differs when analyzing employment in a partnership setting; the concern there
is an individual's status within his or her organization. Id. at 802. By contrast, when
examining an independent contractor, the question is whether the person is a member of
the entity. Id.
88. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the EEOC's re-
sponsibility to administer and enforce the Act.
89. See supra note 44 discussing the factors the EEOC uses in determining whether
an individual is an employee or a partner.
90. Moreover, the court's decision leaves open the possibility that individuals who
are actually employers will receive benefits which Congress designed for employees. To
more accurately follow Congressional intent, a court should examine the organization,
recalling the need to prohibit employer discrimination against employees.
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becomes an additional factor that professionals must weigh in deciding
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